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Halliburton II : A Missed Opportunity to Right the Wrong
in Rule 10b-5 based Class Actions
Erich L. Schmitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2014, many large, publicly traded corporations likely
awaited the decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund1 in the
hopes of transforming securities class action litigation and ending over
two decades of unjust relief for class action securities fraud plaintiffs.
But, the outcome provided little difference as class action securities
fraud suits continue to fuel itself as a multi-billion dollar industry.2
Between 1996 and 2013, the industry has produced nearly $80 billion
in settlements, while between 1996 and 2012 the average settlement
amount was approximately $42 million.3  It is no wonder then that the
measly little investor would strike fear among many large
corporations.
An investor may rely on countless sources when deciding to
purchase stock in a publicly traded corporation, whether it is insight
from a friend, The Wall Street Journal, or merely his own ideals which
may align with a particular company.  Regardless of the mode of in-
formation and whether it was ancillary to the transaction, there is a
chance that this investor may have acted on incomplete or inaccurate
information.4  Nevertheless, the purchase of a security results in two
obvious outcomes for investors: their actions may result in a gain, or
consequently, their actions may result in a loss.  But, the fact that the
investor has acted on incomplete or inaccurate information and has
suffered a resulting loss does not mean that they have been defrauded
or mislead.5
* Juris Doctor, Certificate in Business Law, DePaul University College of Law, 2015.
1. Haliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. See Greg Stohr, Investor Class Actions Seen at Risk in Halliburton Case, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESS (Feb. 27, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-27/investor-
class-actions-seen-at-risk-in-halliburton-case.
3. See Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan, Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements,
2013 Review and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, https://www.cornerstone.com/Publica
tions/Research/Post-Reform-Act-Settlements (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
4. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 n. 27 (1983)).
5. Id. at 248.
249
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Since Basic Inc. v. Levinson in 1988, nearly all federal courts have
upheld the ability for class-action investors to recover damages by
simply showing that their stock was re-sold at a loss.6  This resulted
from a precedential rule of law set out in Basic (“Basic presump-
tion”), which assists investors in overcoming the main roadblocks as-
sociated with Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class-action lawsuits; namely,
proof of the element of the cause of action that the investor plaintiffs
relied on a company’s alleged misstatement when purchasing the se-
curity, and that questions of law or fact common to investor plaintiffs
predominate over individual questions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23.7  The Basic presumption essentially
reduces the burden for class-action plaintiffs that individual plaintiffs
would otherwise have to prove.  Without the presumption, class ac-
tions would be unwarranted as judges would be compelled to conduct
multiple personalized inquiries for each plaintiff.8
It has been over twenty-five years since Basic was decided.  Strides
in research on securities markets and investor interaction, as well as a
fundamental understanding of law helps prove that the Basic pre-
sumption no longer stands as good law.  This article attempts to
demonstrate that the recent Halliburton Court missed the opportunity
to rid the Basic presumption.9 Further, this article attempts to rebut
the Halliburton majority’s reasoning for upholding the Basic presump-
tion and to demonstrate their erroneous oversight and improper appli-
cation of the evidence.
Part II provides an educational introduction to fraud-on-the-market
theory, the Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud provision, as well as background to
Halliburton I and II.  Part III discusses Halliburton’s first main argu-
ment regarding market efficiency and why the markets do not behave
the way the Basic presumption assumes they do.  Part IV discusses
Halliburton’s second main argument regarding the fallacies of the ‘re-
liance on the integrity of the market price’ requirement and the
Court’s blanket view of investors.  Part V discusses Halliburton’s ef-
fect on the use of F.R.C.P. Rule 23 in securities fraud class-action
suits.
6. Id. at 256.
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (1934); Greg Stohr, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
8. See Greg Stohr, supra note 2.
9. See Donald C. Langevoort, Halliburton II and Market Efficiency, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (July 10, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/10/halliburton-ii-and-market-
efficiency/.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Basic and the Endorsement of Fraud-On-The-Market Theory
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Practices provision (“Rule 10b-5”), is a
securities anti-fraud provision that essentially renders direct or indi-
rect attempts by companies to defraud shareholders through the use
of false statement or omission of material information with the intent
to deceive as unlawful and punishable conduct.10  For a plaintiff to
recover damages for violations of Rule 10b–5, the plaintiff must show:
1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; 2) sci-
enter; 3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and
the purchase or sale of a security; 4) reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion or omission; 5) economic loss; and 6) loss causation.11
Despite the explicit language of the rule, the Basic court reasoned
that requiring the plaintiff to prove the element of reliance was overly
burdensome.12  They reasoned that it is too difficult and speculative to
ask an individual plaintiff to show facts as to how he would have acted
had any omitted material information regarding a company had been
disclosed or if a misrepresentation had not been made.13  Further-
more, since each plaintiff is unique, asking each to demonstrate these
facts would effectively prevent class certification under FRCP Rule 23
because individualized questions would predominate over common
ones.14  For easy facilitation of class enforcement, Basic ruled that se-
curities fraud plaintiffs moving for class action certification can invoke
a rebuttable presumption of reliance based on the underlying fraud-
on-the-market theory whereby a company’s stock price on an open
and developed securities market is determined by any and all publicly
available information, including any misrepresentations.15
Plaintiffs in the Basic decision utilized the presumption of reliance
by alleging that they relied on the integrity of the price reflected in the
market which incorporates all publicly available information pursuant
to the efficient market hypothesis.16  Therefore, any omission or alleg-
edly misleading statement can defraud an investor even if that inves-
10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
11. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (quoting Amgen
Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)); see Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317–1318 (2011).
12. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
16. Id. at 247; James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building
on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1722 (2013).
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tor does not directly rely on it because it is already impounded into
the price of the security.17  Thus, “fraud-on-the-market theory [effec-
tively] shifts the focus from an individual’s reliance on a misstatement
to the misstatement’s effect on the security’s price, and to the [class-
wide] reliance on [the] price.”18
B. Halliburton’s First Encounter with the Supreme Court –
Halliburton I (2011)
In Halliburton I, plaintiff Erica P. John Fund (“EPJ”) alleged that
in an attempt to inflate their stock value, defendant Halliburton made
“[several] [ ]representations regarding its potential liability in asbestos
litigation, its expected revenue from certain construction contracts,
and the anticipated benefits of its merger with another company.”19
Thereafter, Halliburton disclosed several corrective representations
which caused their stock price to drop, resulting in a loss for inves-
tors.20  EPJ subsequently sued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
moving the Court to certify class action under F.R.C.P. Rule 23(a) for
all investors who purchased Halliburton common stock during the pe-
riod between the alleged misrepresentations and the corrective repre-
sentations.21  The District Court found that EPJ could satisfy the
requirements of class certification under Rule 23; however, they could
not prove loss causation as required by circuit precedent to invoke
Basic’s presumption.22  The Fifth Circuit denied on the same
grounds.23  EPJ petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court va-
cated the Fifth Circuits’ judgment, explaining that “nothing in ‘Basic
or its logic’ to justify the [circuits’] requirement that securities fraud
plaintiffs prove loss causation at the class certification stage in order
to invoke Basic’s presumption of reliance.”24  The case was remanded
down to the district court.
17. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir.
1986)).
18. Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Eco-
nomic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994).
19. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2014).
20. See id. at 2405-06.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2406.
23. Id.
24. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
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C. Halliburton’s Second Encounter with the Supreme Court –
Halliburton II (2014).
On remand, Halliburton argued that class certification was inappro-
priate because evidence entered earlier in the case to “disprove loss
causation also showed that none of its alleged misrepresentations had
actually affected its stock price.”25  After showing a lack of price im-
pact, “Halliburton contended [that] it had rebutted Basic’s presump-
tion that the members of the proposed class had relied on its alleged
misrepresentations simply by buying or selling its stock at the market
price.”26  Thus, without the presumption, Halliburton contended that
class certification under Rule 23 is inappropriate and the investors
must prove reliance on an individual basis.27  The district court denied
the argument and went forward with certifying the class under Rule 23
based on the Basic presumption.28  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding
that “Halliburton could not use such evidence for that purpose at the
class certification stage [because] ‘price impact’ . . . ‘does not bear on
the question of common question predominance, and is thus appropri-
ately considered only on the merits after the class has been
certified.’”29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to decide whether se-
curities fraud defendants may attempt to rebut the Basic presumption
at the class certification stage with evidence of a lack of price impact.30
Furthermore, and prompted largely by Justice Alito’s invitation in
Amgen31, the Court accepted Halliburton’s request to reconsider the
presumption of reliance for securities fraud claims that was previously
adopted in Basic.32
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07 (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.,
718 F.3d 423, 435 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)).
30. Id. at 2407. See Langevoort, supra note 9 (“Certiorari was granted largely in response to
the question Justice Alito posed in Amgen: do developments in our contemporary understanding
of stock market efficiency—particularly skepticism about how efficient they really are—call into
question Basic’s fundamental assumptions?”).
31. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J.
concurring).
32. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407.
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III. THE DEBATE ON MARKET EFFICIENCY
A. The Court Erroneously Ignored Evidence that Clearly Defeats
Stare Decisis Protection
One of Halliburton’s primary arguments for overturning Basic’s
presumption is that Basic’s view of market efficiency is past its prime
due to “overwhelming empirical evidence” suggesting that the “mar-
kets are not fundamentally efficient” as once thought.33  Recall that
the Basic court relied on the premise that the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available infor-
mation, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.34  This premise
stemmed from a theory known as the ‘efficient market hypothesis,’
which questions whether it is possible for an investor to actually beat
the stock market.35  Simply put, the issue is “whether an investor with
access to all publicly-available information about the firm and its mar-
kets, in addition to past prices, and with sufficient analytical prowess
could outperform the market.”36
Market efficiency can be generally identified through three theoret-
ical models: weak-form, semi-strong form, and strong form.37 Basic
set precedence by adopting the ‘semi-strong’ model which insists that
the price of a stock reflects historical pricing information as well as all
available public information.38
It was an erroneous move by Basic in adopting a semi-strong form
of the efficient market hypothesis.39  This singular view of the market
is shallow and unsophisticated, and does not stand today when taking
into account the mountains of evidence demonstrating that no market
has true efficiency.  Furthermore, this faulty assumption can also lead
to grossly unfair results when considering the possibility of paying out
enormous sums of damages, enough to financially ruin a company,
when a vast majority of plaintiffs can show little more than a decline
33. Id. at 2409.
34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
35. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 462 (2006).
36. Id.
37. William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in A Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 850 (2005) (“The weak form . . . postulates that a stock’s price is
at least substantially independent of past price performance . . . . The semi-strong form goes
further, claiming ‘that current prices fully reflect public knowledge . . . .’ Finally, the strong form
. . . asserts that both public and private information are [sic] fully reflected in the price of a
stock.”).
38. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 35, at 463-64.
39. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2420 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
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in stock price.  In absence of “the requisite academic knowledge of
empirical markets and efficient-market hypothesis” the Basic court
“attempted to replace traditional legal analysis with economic
theorization.”40
To support its contention that markets are not efficient, Halliburton
insisted that Basic’s fundamental error was adopting a dualistic, yes or
no question to the efficiency.41  Halliburton cites to several examples
and studies to show that most public information is often not incorpo-
rated with any immediacy or rationality into the market price of
stock.42  This, in theory, would be successful in rebutting Basic’s fun-
damental premise.  However, the Court responded by downplaying its
importance and ignoring the evidence.
The Court explained that “the presumption of reliance was not con-
clusively to adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely
publicly available information is reflected in market price.”43  Rather,
the presumption is a matter of degree, which is why it is rebuttable.44
The Court furthered their reasoning on the premise “that market pro-
fessionals generally consider most publicly announced material state-
ments about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.”45  The
way they see it, Halliburton failed to take Basic on its own terms.  The
Court discounted Halliburton’s arguments, stating that although “the
. . . price [of a stock] may be inaccurate, [it] does not detract from the
fact that false statements affect it, and cause loss, which is all that
Basic requires.”46  The Court admits that there are critics of the pre-
sumption, but downplayed the importance.  Above all, the Court be-
lieved that Halliburton did not identify a significant reason for
deviating from stare decisis protection, noting that Halliburton failed
to identify a “fundamental shift in economic theory that could justify
40. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252-53 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“[W]ith no staff economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market
hypothesis,’ no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped
to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.”).
41. Halliburton Co., 134 U.S. at 2409 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 20, Halliburton Co., 134
S. Ct. 2398 (No. 13-317), 2013 WL 6907610 at *20 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners] (quoting
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151,
167 (2009))).
42. See id. at 2409 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 17).
43. Id. at 2410 (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248 n.28).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2410 (emphasis added) (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248 n.24).
46. Id. at 2410 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679,
685 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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overruling a precedent on the ground that it misunderstood, or has
since been overtaken by, economic realities.”47
B. Studies show that the markets do not behave
the way Basic assumed
Justice Kagan struggled at oral argument to rebut Halliburton’s
counsel, Mr. Aaron Streett, and their contention that Basic’s binary
process to market efficiency is unwarranted and inequitable.48  The
‘yes or no’ answer to market efficiency is far too extreme when ac-
counting for how the markets realistically operate.  This is because no
market is truly efficient.  Even the great Warren Buffet once said that
he would “be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were
efficient.”49  Doubts about market efficiency are more commonplace
today than they were when Basic was decided, lending to the fact that
the presumption was certainly acceptable and sound theory at one
time.50  Today however, the Halliburton Court failed to admit that
each market processes information with variable efficiency depending
on factors such as the mode of dissemination, the reach of dissemina-
tion, and how easily the information is comprehended.51  Instead, the
majority relied on mere assumptions of the market instead of properly
weighing strong evidence to the contrary.
A court cannot simply answer yes or no to the market efficiency
question.  This is because well-developed markets such as the New
York Stock Exchange do not uniformly reflect market prices of securi-
ties.52  In fact, no market is completely efficient, for there are many
types of public information not incorporated rapidly into the price of a
stock.53  As it turns out, the type of information as well as the ability
to comprehend it assists in explaining the rate at which the informa-
tion will be impounded into the price of a security.54
47. Halliburton Co., 134 U.S. at 2410.
48. See Oral Argument at 5:28, Halliburton Co. 134 U.S. 2398 (No. 13-317), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_13_317.
49. Kevin Johnston, Examples of Market Inefficiency, AZCENTRAL, http://yourbusiness.azcen
tral.com/examples-market-inefficiency-3712.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
50. Halliburton Co., 134 U.S. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Langevoort, supra note 41, at 175).
51. See id. at 2409 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 20–21).
52. See id. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring).
53. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Halliburton Co.,
134 U.S. 2398 (No. 13-317), 2014 WL 60721 at *15 [hereinafter Brief of Law Professors].
54. See Cox, supra note 16, at 1731; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 597-98 (1984) (discussing information
costs and market efficiency).
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Studies have found that when information is released regarding
stock splits or dividend changes, the price reflects the information
with immediacy, especially when it is a very large, publicly traded
company, like Apple or Exxon Mobil.55  However, these types of in-
formation are straightforward, easily understood, and widely dissemi-
nated.56  The idea drops off the ledge when an investor must expend
their large amounts of time and money into assessing information that
is difficult to comprehend.57
Easily digestible information such as merger announcements, stock
splits, or even Wall Street Journal articles may be incorporated
quickly, while information that is broadly applicable or technical such
as certain SEC filings may be incorporated at a snail’s pace, and possi-
bly even ignored.58  Professor Donald Langevoort, a well-known
scholar on the subject, has noted that “[o]ne of the most common
types of material disclosures - an earnings surprise - actually takes a
while to be fully impounded, even for large-cap stocks, and even var-
ies depending on whether it is good news or bad.”59  These findings
tend to show that an increase in difficulty in comprehending a given
piece of information, i.e., information that requires special knowledge,
prolongs the process of impounding that information into the price of
a security.60  Additionally, other studies have found alternative vari-
ables that affect the process time including the costs of processing, the
number of analysts studying the specific stock or company, and even
the presence of arbitragers.61
A study by Saeyoung Chang and David Suk demonstrates that in-
formation that is difficult to obtain or understand, yet publicly availa-
ble, can fail to be impounded with immediacy.  To examine
informational efficiency, the two initiated a study by observing
changes in the stock price at two different time intervals after com-
pany insiders filed a Section 16 report with the SEC.62  The first time
interval that the price on was measured was the day in which the Sec-
55. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 653 (2003).
56. See id. at 653.
57. See id. at 653–56.
58. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2421 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
59. Brief of Law Professors at 16 (quoting Langevoort, supra note 41, at 170).
60. See Stout, supra note 55, at 656.
61. See Cox, supra note 16, at 1732.
62. See Stout, supra note 55, at 653-54.  Essentially, Section 16 filings “convert formerly un-
available ‘private’ information” known only to corporate insiders “into available ‘public’ infor-
mation that can be incorporated into [the] market price.”
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tion 16 report was filed.63  At this point, the information became pub-
lic.  The second time interval that the price was measured on was the
day in which the report was republished in the Wall Street Journal,
which on average was completed ten days after the initial filing and
price measurement.64  Chang and Suk observed a drastic price change
in both dates.65  They further found that the market’s initial re-
sponse66 to the filings were incomplete and delayed even though the
information was publicly available.67
The Brief for Petitioners in Halliburton points to an interesting in-
stance regarding a front-page New York Times article which featured
EntreMed, a pharmaceutical company.68  The front-page story cov-
ered recent innovations in cancer research which highlighted the En-
treMed company.69  At the closing of the market on the following
Monday after the article was released, EntreMed stock, which had
closed the previous Friday at $12 per share, had shot up to $52 per
share.70  The catch here is that this front-page story did not run new
news.71  The actual substantive story ran approximately five months
prior in two different journals: a scientific journal called ‘Nature’ and
another journal called ‘Times’.72  This observance tends to show that
drastic deviations from what is deemed an efficient market occur even
for large companies with widely traded stocks.73
The Brief for Petitioners bolsters its arguments by referencing this
specific deviation from the efficient market hypothesis, which oc-
curred right in front of Basic court’s eyes.  However, all except Justice
White failed to acknowledge it in the Basic opinion.
Mere weeks before oral argument, Black Monday occurred.74  On
October 19, 1987, the securities and futures markets around the world
63. See id. at 653.
64. Id.
65. See id. (quoting Saeyoung Chang & David Y. Suk, Stock Prices and the Secondary Dissem-
ination of Information: The Wall Street Journal’s “Insider Trading Spotlight” Column, 33 FIN.
REV. 115-17 (1998)).
66. “Although the SEC generally makes Section 16 filings available to the public on same day
they are received, to read them an interested investor must go to the SEC’s reading room or
subscribe to an online service.  Alternatively, if the investor is willing to wait a few days, she can
get the same information by buying a Wall Street Journal.”
Stout, supra note 55 at 654 (quoting Chang & Suk, supra note 65, at 115-17).
67. See id. at 653 (quoting Chang & Suk, supra note 65, 115-17).
68. Brief for Petitioners at 17.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Langevoort, supra note 41, at 175.
74. Brief for Petitioners at 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB204.txt unknown Seq: 11 27-MAY-16 7:38
2015] HALLIBURTON II : A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 259
crashed, resulting in record drops on several different exchanges.75
“The market crash of 1987 is a significant event not just because of the
swiftness and severity of the market decline, but also because it
showed the weaknesses of the trading systems themselves . . . how
they could be strained” . . . while contemporaneously demonstrating
the “difficulty in gathering information” in such a “rapidly changing
and chaotic environment.”76  Black Monday demonstrated that ex-
changes, even the New York Stock Exchange, are not fundamentally
efficient because, as they point out, “it is impossible to locate any in-
formation that could be responsible for a twenty-two percent devalua-
tion of corporate assets on that single day, or a thirty-six percent
devaluation from the market’s peak in late August.”77  Other recent
market changes further demonstrate the wild inefficiencies of the mar-
ket.  For instance, the ‘Dot-com Bubble’78 demonstrates inefficiency
in the market where the ‘tech’ securities were far overvalued.79  The
Great Recession of 2008 is another demonstration.80  Thus, market
swings and drastic deviations call into question the sure-noted idea of
market efficiency as well.81  While large exchanges like the NYSE may
be the most efficient, they are not efficient enough to justify Basic’s
presumption and the underlying efficient market hypothesis.82
The above studies and examples demonstrate that new information
is impounded into the price of a security at a rate much slower and
even more incompletely than a conventional view of market efficiency
suggests.83  “[N]ot all public information will be impounded in a secur-
ity’s price with the same alacrity, or perhaps with any specific quick-
ness at all.”84  Thus, the Court should have overturned Basic as the
above examples demonstrate a fundamental shift in the knowledge
75. Mark A. Carlson, A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the
Federal Reserve Response, Finance and Economic Discussion Series Response, BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, (Nov. 2006) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Brief for Petitioners at 18 (quoting Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corpora-
tions Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 974 (1991)).
78. Dotcom Bubble, Investopedia (March 19, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/ terms/d/
dotcom-bubble.asp.
79. Brief for Petitioners at 18 (quoting Fisher, supra note 37, at 847, 898).
80. Id.
81. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2421 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U.L.REV. 135, 141 (2002)); see also Dun-
bar & Heller, supra note 35, at 476-83.
82. Brief for Petitioners at 18.
83. See Stout, supra note 55, at 653.
84. See Cox, supra note 16, at 1732.
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and understanding of market efficiency which renders Basic’s pre-
sumption void.
C. The Court’s Argument that the PSLRA Endorses Basic
is Unfounded
In declining to over-rule the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the
Halliburton Court stood behind the pillars of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) of 1995 to bolster its reasoning.85
The PSLRA is congressional reform of securities litigation that was
enacted “to combat perceived abuses in securities litigation with
heightened pleading requirements, limits on damages and attorney’s
fees, a ‘safe harbor’ for certain kinds of statements, restrictions on the
selection of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, sanctions for friv-
olous litigation, and stays of discovery pending motions to dismiss.”86
The Court’s rational was that if Congress failed to modify Basic dur-
ing the reform, the intent must be to maintain Basic as good law.87
However, this argument only passes muster on a political level.  Many
have argued, quite reasonably, that the language is not a clear en-
dorsement of Basic, but rather “acquiescence in the securities class
action regime that it created.”88  One review of this issue explains that
the “natural conservative judicial move is to defer.”89  Furthermore,
the reform is inherently dependent on the “continued existence of
Rule 10b-5 class actions,” for without it, there would be no PSLRA.90
Thus, overruling Basic would essentially undermine the tenants that
the PSLRA stands on.91  To resolve this quandary, the PSLRA would
need to be scratched and a new reform built by Congress.
85. 134 S. Ct. at 2413 (2014).
86. Id.  (“And to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing these restrictions by bringing securities
class actions under state law in state court, Congress also enacted the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 3227, which precludes many state law class actions alleging
securities fraud.”).
87. Id.
88. Class Actions — Presumption of Reliance Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 128 (Vol. 1) HARV. L.
REV. 291, 298 (2014) available at http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
halliburton_co_v_erica_p_john_fund _inc.pdf.
89. Id. (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections
on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manu-
script at 7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475036 [http://perma.cc/92M8-FFDT]).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 298-99 (“For example, the PSLRA can be understood as ‘a political compromise that
preserves the foundation of the fraud-on-the-market class action while making it harder for
plaintiffs to bring, plead[,] and prove a successful claim,’ . . . the sort of far-reaching judicial
intervention that could disturb the careful balance that Congress has struck.” (quoting Donald
C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second
Coming of Halliburton, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6))).
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D. The Efficient Market Hypothesis Cannot be Effectively Applied
Can there even be an exemplary efficient market?  Halliburton
points to Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-capital-markets hy-
pothesis and recent Nobel laureate in economics to justify their point
that market efficiency is simply not testable.92  Although Fama insists
that market efficiency “must be tested jointly with some model of
equilibrium” such as “an asset-pricing model,” he admits there are fal-
lacies in attaining it.93  Even for financial economists, it’s next to im-
possible to devise a model or calculation when there is no baseline to
gauge the efficiency of a market.94  What’s worse is that the judicial
system is having an even more difficult time rationalizing it.  The
lower federal courts have fashioned several multi-factor tests95 in an
attempt to create parity, but it is obvious that after years of varied
applications and diverse interpretations, the result is even more prob-
lematic than in the beginning.96  The tests remain fundamentally
flawed in determining market efficiency.  While not bound by Basic,
an overwhelming amount of state courts refuse to adopt its theory.97
Most notably, the California Supreme Court was troubled in applying
Basic’s shaky theory and commented that “permit[ting] common law
claims based on the fraud-on-the-market [theory] would open the
door to class action lawsuits based on exceedingly speculative
theories.”98
92. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 46-47 (quoting Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capi-
tal Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991)).
93. Fama, supra note 84 at 1575-76; see Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 376 (2014).
94. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 47 (quoting Alon Brav & James B. Heaton,
Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 525 (2003)).
95. Grundfest, supra note 93, at 378 (“The five-factor Cammer test is the dominant technique
applied by the courts to determine whether a market is efficient for purposes of supporting the
fraud on the market presumption.  That test considers trading volume, analyst coverage, the
number of market makers and arbitrageurs, the issuer’s ability to file on Form S-3, and the
responsiveness of the market price to new information.” (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.
Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989))).
96. See Brief of Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amicus
Curie Supporting Petitioners at 7, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014), (No 13-317) 2014 WL 69391 at *7 (quoting Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar& Daniel
A. McLaughlin, Assessing Market Efficiency for Reliance on the Fraud-on-the Market Doctrine
After Wal-Mart and Amgen, 26 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECON. (forthcoming) available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2302734); Paul A. Ferillo, Frederick C. Dunbar & David Tabak, The “Less Than”
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Mar-
ket Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 102 (2004).
97. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note, 41, at 50.
98. Id. (quoting Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 584 (Cal. 1993)).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB204.txt unknown Seq: 14 27-MAY-16 7:38
262 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:249
Market efficiency is difficult for any court to answer because of its
complexities and nuances deeply rooted in economic theory.99  Re-
quiring the courts to engage in heavy debate about whether the mar-
ket is efficient in each case asks them to step into the shoes of
economic scholars.100  But, those shoes were not meant to fit the judi-
ciary.  Professor Donald Langevoort cautions the courts from placing
too much time and effort into determining the efficiency of the market
for class certification.101  This is because so long as the Basic presump-
tion remains good law, a judge must ultimately answer the question as
‘yes or no’ in order to move to the next step of the process.102  Due to
the nature and operation of the presumption, the answer can never be
sometimes yes, and sometimes no.  The sliding scale, then, appears to
be an inequitable mode to determine market efficiency.
Nevertheless, Basic’s view of market efficiency no longer holds
true.103  The studies and empirical evidence of today demonstrate that
the markets have simply too many levels of inefficiency and incorpo-
rate information at varying rates.104  It was misapplied when it was
ruled and should no longer apply today due to “‘overwhelming empir-
ical evidence’ . . . suggest[ing] that capital markets are not fundamen-
tally efficient.”105
IV. THE DEBATE ON INVESTOR RELIANCE ON THE INTEGRITY
OF A MARKET PRICE
A. The Court’s Rebuttal to Halliburton’s Arguments
is Severely Strained
In further attempting to overrule Basic, Halliburton also argues
against the underlying premise that investors invest in reliance on the
integrity of the market price of a security.106  That is, investors trust
that the price of the security reflects its true value, which includes any
fraud impounded into the price, and use it as “an unbiased reference
point to decide whether to buy, sell, sell short, [or] engage in options
99. See Brief of Former SEC Commissioner and Officials and Law Professors, supra note 96,
at 6 (quoting Grundfest, supra note 93, at 375).
100. See Langevoort, supra note 9.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
104. See Brief of Former SEC Commissioner and Officials and Law Professors, supra note 96,
at 5-6.
105. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2409 (2014) (quoting Lev &
de Villiers, supra note 18).
106. See id. at 2410.
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trading.”107  In support of its argument, Halliburton identifies numer-
ous classes of investors who essentially do not rely on the integrity of
the market price.108  Since many investors are indifferent to prices, the
courts should not institute the blanket presumption that investors rely
on the integrity of those prices.109 Halliburton specifically points to
the value investor as one who attempts to profit not on reliance in the
integrity of the price, but rather on the incompleteness of that secur-
ity’s price.110
However, the Court responds by explaining that Basic never denied
the existence of all the investors Halliburton pointed to; rather, it is
sufficient that most investors “will rely on the security’s market price
as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public
information.”111  The Court furthers its argument by attacking the
value investor, stating that “[s]uch an investor implicitly relies on the
fact that a stock’s market price will eventually reflect material infor-
mation—how else could the market correction on which his profit de-
pends occur?”112
B. Do Stockholders Truly Rely on the Integrity
of the Market Price?
The Court ignores clear evidence contrary to their blanket assump-
tion of investors.  The fact is, any likelihood that “investors are likely
to display similar, or common, behavior, at least in terms of relying on
the market price . . . no longer holds if different investors are behaving
according to different behavioral rules” and underlying reasons.113
This begs the question: how can the Court be this blind?
The idea of beating the market seems to be inherent in the minds of
investors.  This may be the generalized reason why many investors are
107. Langevoort, supra note 41, at 159-60; see Halliburton Co.,134 S. Ct. at 2421.
108. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2410.
109. Id. at 2411.
110. See id.; Value investing is:
The strategy of selecting stocks that trade for less than their intrinsic values.  Value investors
actively seek stocks of companies that they believe the market has undervalued.  They believe
the market overreacts to good and bad news, resulting in stock price movements that do not
correspond with the company’s long-term fundamentals.  The result is an opportunity for value
investors to profit by buying when the price is deflated.
Investopedia, Value Investing (Feb. 25. 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/valueinvest
ing.asp?layout=org.
111. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct.  at 2411 (emphasis added) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)).
112. Id.
113. Brief for Petitioners at 16, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317), 2013 WL 6907610 (quoting Dunbar and Heller, supra note 35, at 521).
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blinded by their emotions with the hopes of making short-term
gains.114  However, because many investors may succumb to their
emotions does not mean they rely on the integrity of the market price
of a security.  Recent advances in behavioral finance lends strongly to
the underlying thought processes and emotions of investors.  Further-
more, behavioral finance also helps us understand why investor’s per-
sonal behavior rules can be an important impetus in their particular
decisions.115  A basic, albeit shallow, idea is that an investor’s thought
process does not go any further than the idea of ‘striking it rich,’ hop-
ing that the price of the security will go up regardless of whether the
price is accurate or not.  Alternatively, some emotionally-driven inves-
tors may “rationally purchase a stock on the probability that” their
luck will continue before the bubble bursts.116  Others may “‘ration-
ally herd because they weigh more the decisions of others’ than infor-
mation about the stock.”117  Thus, “the emerging field of behavioral
finance suggests that differing investor assessments of value appear to
be the rule, rather than the exception.”118
Investors, even emotionally-driven investors, also tend to trade on
outside factors.119  Risk aversion provides one outside factor.  Alter-
native forms of trading, such as options, futures, and forward contracts
allow investors to hedge against the risk that the current price of a
security does not accurately reflect its true value.120  While more ad-
vanced investors might utilize these forms of investing, they neverthe-
less make up a strong presence in the financial markets.  Similarly,
those who invest in alternate investment vehicles such as hedge funds
utilize a system of identifying under or overpriced securities as well as
various derivative forms of trading and arbitrage.121
Professor Lynn Stout, a leading academic in the field, has recog-
nized that “some portion of the trading observed in secondary mar-
kets almost certainly reflects the changing liquidity needs of
114. See MFS Fund Distributors, Emotion Drives Investor Decisions (Dec 30, 2014), https://
www.mfs.com/wps/FileServerServlet?articleId=templatedata/internet/file/data/sales_tools/mfsp_
stayin_sfl&servletCommand=default.
115. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 16 (quoting Dunbar and Heller, supra note
35, at 520-21).
116. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 16 (quoting Dunbar & Heller, supra note 35, at
521).
117. Id.
118. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 n.10 (D. Mass. 2006).
119. See Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2422.
120. See Investopedia, Hedge (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp
?layout=org.
121. See Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 180
(2007).
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investors.”122  She also points out that personal tax concerns of an in-
vestor may trigger transactions unrelated to the integrity of the price
of a security.123  A person can “reduce her tax liability by offsetting
otherwise-taxable income,” that is, by selling a security at a price less
than what she paid for it.124  An investor’s need to balance his portfo-
lio provides another alternative.125  One may attempt to maintain “a
desired risk level by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks in combi-
nation with some riskless asset, such as government bonds.”126  In the
alternative, “a stock might appreciate so greatly that it comes to con-
stitute too large a portion of the investor’s portfolio,” thus prompting
one to “sell off some of it to reduce [the] diversifiable risk.”127
Many investors are not the reasonable investors Basic presumes
them to be.128  Today, they are often indifferent to prices based on
numerous underlying factors, which undermines the integrity of secur-
ity prices.129  Furthermore, with the rise in technology, general under-
standing of the financial markets, individual presence in the financial
markets, and the spread of alternative forms of trading, this blanket
assumption that investors generally rely on the integrity security
prices seems naı¨ve.  The evidence, then, appears to be at odds with
Basic’s fundamental understanding, and prompts the need to render
the Basic presumption void.130
V. HALLIBURTON’S EFFECT ON F.R.C.P. RULE 23
A. Background to F.R.C.P. Rule 23
Under F.R.C.P. Rule 23(a), one or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only
if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
122. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 657 (1995).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 658.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors,
Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1504 (2013).
129. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2422 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
130. Id.
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fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.131  Further-
more, and largely at issue to the interpretation of the Basic presump-
tion, is that under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained if
Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.132
B. The Court Correctly Ruled that Halliburton Should Be
Allowed to Show Evidence of Price Impact
at the Class Certification Stage
The Fifth Circuit, and similarly the trial court, disallowed Hallibur-
ton the ability to show evidence of price impact at the certification
stage because, as they explained, it “does not bear on the question of
common question predominance [under Rule 23(b)(3)], and is thus
appropriately considered only at trial on the merits after the class has
been certified.”133  The lower courts, as well as EPJ argued that price
impact is most similar to the materiality issue discussed in the Su-
preme Court’s recent ruling in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans and Trust Funds.134
In Amgen, the Court held that it is essential for securities fraud
plaintiffs to prove the materiality prong of a 10b-5 cause of action at
trial on the merits; however, it is not necessary for proof at class certi-
fication stage.135  This is because any “alleged misrepresentations and
omissions, whether material or immaterial, would be so equally for all
investors composing the class” . . . and thus, “the plaintiff class’s in-
ability to prove materiality would not result in individual questions
predominating.”136  Therefore, “the class is entirely cohesive” and
their case “will prevail or fail in unison.”137
At the trial court and Fifth Circuit, Halliburton vigorously argued
that the Court should not certify the class because it had already re-
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
132. Id. § 23(b)(3).
133. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halli-
burton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 435 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013), vacated and re-
manded, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)).
134. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (quoting
Matrix Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011)); see Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct.
at 2407-08 (2014).
135. See id. at 1191.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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butted the presumption of reliance through a previous showing of lack
of price impact.138  Halliburton reasoned that “a plaintiff class which
fails to show price impact would only lose the class-wide presumption
of reliance, leaving individual plaintiffs with viable fraud claims.”139
However, the Fifth Circuit interpreted that Amgen’s materiality issue
is most analogous to price-impact and should be treated the same –
reserved for trial on the merits rather than class certification stage.140
At the Supreme Court, Halliburton insisted that the lower courts
erroneously denied their rebuttal.141  Through the very language of
Basic itself, securities fraud defendants may “rebut the presumption
by showing that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distor-
tion of price.”142  Thus, EPJ tried, but failed.  The Court correctly rea-
soned that the essence of the Basic presumption is price impact.143
Without it, a plaintiff cannot maintain class certification.144  There-
fore, the Court held that defendants such as Halliburton may show,
directly or indirectly, evidence of price impact at the class certification
stage.145
C. Repercussions of Defendants’ Ability to Rebut Price Impact in
Rule 10b-5 Securities Fraud Class-Actions
Although it was a small, hollow victory for Halliburton, there is
very few benefits for defendants in these types of securities fraud class
action cases.  Defendants will likely see plaintiffs suffer in their wal-
lets.146  If defendants raise price impact arguments at class certifica-
tion stage, there will certainly be an increase in event studies and
experts to rebut defendant’s arguments.147  With the increase cost of
litigation, plaintiffs may second guess themselves as to whether bring-
ing an enormous class action suit is worth the cost if they have a
weaker case.148  Furthermore, plaintiffs may seek to utilize different
standards and presumptions that are more advantageous to their case
138. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
139. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 434 (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 636 (2013) vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
140. Id.
141. See Brief for Petitioners at 49 Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
142. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)).
143. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2407-08.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Douglass W. Greene, First Take on Halliburton II: The Price-Impact Rule May Not Have
Much Practical Impact, LANE POWELL (June 24, 2014), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/ 2014/06/
24/first-take-on-halliburton-ii-the-price-impact-rule-may-not-have-much-practical-impact/.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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instead of the Basic presumption.  For instance, an alternative such as
a Section 11 claim may appear favorable due to the lack of a true
reliance element.149  Additionally, plaintiffs may elect to utilize the
presumption created by Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S.150,
“which held that proof of reliance is not necessary to support a claim
based on omissions.”151
Despite any advantages that potential defendants may have gained
under Halliburton, potential plaintiffs are likely to benefit the most
from this decision.152  Technically, defendants have always had, and as
Halliburton merely reiterates, the ability to show evidence that there
was no price impact at class certification based on the language in
Basic.153  Furthermore, because in most cases plaintiffs are already
equipped to offer evidence that an alleged misstatement impacted the
price, there will be no change in that respect.154  While plaintiffs may
be burdened by the costs in demonstrating price impact at the class
certification stage, the negatives end there.155  The additional costs for
experts and studies at class certification may mean that plaintiffs will
be better equipped to negotiate higher settlements since the defen-
dant will be unable to show lack of price impact as plaintiffs will have
already demonstrated it at certification.156  The scope of this advan-
tage does not end there.  Plaintiffs will also be equipped with more
assurance that their case will not get tossed out at the summary judg-
ment stage.157  As David Boies, a practicing attorney at Boies, Schiller
& Flexner pointed out, “defendants who decide to raise price impact
arguments to oppose class certification will have to face shareholders’
discovery demands on the merits of their defenses.”158  This will “ex-
pose defendants to depositions and documents requests they won’t
welcome . . . [and] plaintiffs are going to get a whole lot more informa-
tion at the class certification stage.”159
149. Id.  Note that ‘tracing’ tends to function as a reliance requirement under Section 11.
150. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
151. Greene, supra note 146.
152. Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Halliburton ruling could backfire for securities defendants,
REUTERS (June 23, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/06/23/scotus-halliburton-
ruling-could-backfire-for-securities-defendants/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Frankel, supra note 152.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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D. The Reliance Requirement Remains in Conflict
with F.R.C.P. Rule 23
Part of Justice Thomas’ concurrence takes aim at the inconsistency
between recent case law re-enforcing the proof requirement of Rule
23 and Basic’s presumption that allows plaintiffs to circumvent the
reliance requirement.160  The Basic court once explained that placing
an evidentiary burden on each individual securities fraud plaintiff to
prove reliance for class certification would be oppressive and overly
demanding.161  Today, with the way Rule 23(b)(3) is written, it doesn’t
make it easy for plaintiffs to “prevail on a motion for class certifica-
tion” when the plaintiff must demonstrate predominance through “ev-
identiary proof.”162  But, the way the federal courts have been
enforcing Rule 23 is that if plaintiffs invoke the Basic presumption of
reliance, plaintiffs then “bypass that requirement of evidentiary
proof” and “are deemed to have met the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3).”163
Justice Thomas demonstrates his frustration with this practice and
believes the courts are not giving the proper weight to individualize
evidence of the class members as outlined in Basic.  The fact is that
the language of Basic requires an individualized inquiry, entitling the
“defendant to ask each class member whether he traded in reliance on
the integrity of the market price.”164  But the courts fail to enforce
this.165  The lack of enforcement severely undermines the require-
ments set out in Rule 23.  Thus, plaintiffs who raise the Basic pre-
sumption are unjustly enriched through their exemption from Rule
23’s proof requirement.166
Justice Thomas also takes issue with the way precertification rebut-
tal is carried out.167  “At the class-certification stage, rebuttal is only
directed at the class representatives, which means that counsel only
needs to find one class member who can withstand the challenge” of
reliance and price impact.168  If at most one can withstand, plaintiff
will likely survive class certification, regardless of how many other
class members may not withstand the challenge.  Because of the
160. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2423.
161. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (quoting Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 384 (1970)).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
163. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at2423.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 2423-24
167. Id. at 2424.
168. Id.
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Court’s refusal to allow for individualized inquiries, defendants are
forced to surrender their individualized defenses.169  Settlement pres-
sures rise after this point, providing the defendant with no other alter-
native.170  Thus, as Justice Thomas stated, “the so-called rebuttable
presumption is largely irrebuttable.”171
While the Court’s ruling that Halliburton can rebut the presump-
tion at class-certification by using an event study to show lack of price
impact is a step in the right direction, it does not necessarily overcome
the issues demonstrated above.  The issue with the Basic presumption
is that it merely facilitates class actions in securities fraud;  otherwise,
a class would likely not be certifiable.172  Plaintiffs can utilize this pre-
sumption as a form of circumvention for class certification to over-
come evidentiary proof of the reliance requirement without actually
demonstrating it.173  A loophole, if you will.174  Without a functional
reliance requirement, the essential element that ensures the plaintiff
has actually been defrauded, Rule 10b–5 becomes the very scheme of
“investor’s insurance” the rebuttable presumption was supposed to
prevent.175  It appears then that the treatment of the Basic presump-
tion is an example of overreaching.176
One alternative would be to adopt an individualized reliance re-
quirement.  Support for this alternative comes from Basic’s own lan-
guage.  Essentially, Basic entitles defendants to ask each class member
whether he traded “in reliance on the integrity of the market price,”
which is by nature an inherently individualized assessment.177  But, of
course, plaintiffs would oppose this.  As Professor and Former SEC
Commissioner Joseph Grundfest points out, the main implication of
adopting this requirement is that it would make it far more difficult
for certification.178  “A significant decline in the incidence and magni-
tude of class action claims under section 10(b) would likely result . . .
[which] would likely stimulate calls for a legislative overhaul of the
securities litigation process.”179  This is not such a bad thing for de-
169. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2424.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Grundfest, supra note 93, at 361.
173. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2424.
174. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 35, at 457-58.
175. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2424-25 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252
(1988)).
176. Id. at 2424.
177. Id. at 2423.
178. Grundfest, supra note 93, at 380.
179. Id. at 380-81.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB204.txt unknown Seq: 23 27-MAY-16 7:38
2015] HALLIBURTON II : A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 271
fendants at first glance.  However, Congress would likely think twice
before turning off the lights on a multi-billion dollar industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears as though Halliburton was a missed opportunity to re-
verse the twenty-five plus years of illegitimate hardship for securities
fraud class action defendants.  The Court spent an extraordinary
amount of time on these two parties.  As such, they had plenty of
opportunities to view the evidence.  Some members of the Court
voiced their opinions in opposition, but it wasn’t enough to overcome
the others’ skewed ideals.  While they may feel that they have ren-
dered a fair opinion, they are basically protecting a billion dollar in-
dustry, and diverting massive amounts of funds that could otherwise
be used by the company to fuel its growth and assist with job creation.
There is clear evidence that information impounded into the price of a
security occurs at a rate much slower and even more incompletely
than a conventional view of market efficiency suggests.180  Further-
more, there is clear evidence that many investors are indifferent to
prices based on numerous underlying factors, many of which disregard
the integrity of the price of a security.181  The evidence demonstrated
by this paper as well as the defense did in Halliburton demonstrate a
fundamental shift in economic theory that justifies overturning the
Basic’s presumption.182  The Basic Court, then, created a monster.
And, the only way to rid of it is through the termination of Basic’s
decision.  While multiple individualized assessments are, admittedly,
burdensome to plaintiffs and the court, it is truly the only way to pro-
vide equitability in these types of class actions.  Otherwise, Basic just
acts as a court endorsed loophole for F.R.C.P. Rule 23.183
180. Stout, supra note 55, at 653.
181. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2422.
182. Id. at 2410.
183. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 35, at 457-58.
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